Silicon: social and political problems
What problems does it cause between people, and who carries them?
We found no wars linked to silicon. The main dispute is about forced labor in Xinjiang, where much of the world's polysilicon is made. The US blocks goods from the region unless importers prove otherwise. China calls the claims lies. Trade disputes about tariffs grew from 2025.
Last updated 5 October 2026.
Conflict and disputes
We found no wars, armed groups or smuggling linked to silicon. The disputes are about trade and forced labor.
In June 2021, the United States blocked imports of silica-based products made by Hoshine Silicon Industry, a company in Xinjiang1. The US Commerce Department also put five Xinjiang entities on its Entity List. Among them were Hoshine, Daqo and GCL1. Two days before, a spokesperson of China’s foreign ministry answered a question about a possible US ban on polysilicon from Xinjiang. He said that the real purpose of the forced labor claims was to hold back Chinese industries2.
Trade disputes also divide allies. In November 2025 the EU put tariff quotas on ferroalloys, including those from Norway and Iceland3. The EU Trade Commissioner, Maroš Šefčovič, said the EU could not let a strategic sector collapse under import pressure3. Norway’s trade minister, Cecilie Myrseth, said Norway did not agree and that its companies would suffer3.
Workers and communities
A 2021 report from Sheffield Hallam University examined labor programs in Xinjiang. The authors write that Chinese companies in the region made about 45% of the world’s solar-grade polysilicon4. It cites a 2020 Chinese government report on the placement of 2.6 million minority citizens in jobs4. The authors report that Hoshine, the region’s largest maker of metallurgical silicon, took part in labor transfer programs4. The authors also give the Chinese government’s view: the programs follow Chinese law, and the workers take part voluntarily4.
Jobs in China’s solar industry also fell with prices. The five largest solar companies, including Tongwei, cut their workforce by more than 30% in 20245.
Quartz dust is a known risk for workers. USGS reports that crystalline silica exposure is a main health and safety concern of the US industrial sand industry6. Health effects are outside this chapter.
Who gains and who loses
China gained most of the industry. The US share of world polysilicon capacity fell from 50% in 2005 to less than 2% in 20247. In 2026, the US government said its tariff aimed to build a domestic market that can pay for itself7.
European ferroalloy makers lost market share. By the European Commission’s figures, their share of the EU market fell from 38% to 24% from 2019 to 20243. The EU safeguard is meant to protect them, but it also hits producers in Norway and Iceland.
Chinese producers have also lost money. Polysilicon prices fell by more than 70% in 2023 and another 40% in 20245. At the end of June 2025, Chinese makers held 367,000 tonnes of polysilicon in stock8. We found no source on taxes or royalties from silicon plants.
Public debate
The main public debate is about forced labor in solar supply chains. The US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021 presumes that goods made wholly or in part in Xinjiang are made with forced labor9. To import such goods, a company must show by clear and convincing evidence that no forced labor was used9. The law makes polysilicon a high-priority sector for enforcement9.
The EU regulation on products made with forced labor applies from December 20278. The Sheffield Hallam authors argue that many module makers are exposed, because Daqo supplies the four largest of them4. China rejects the forced labor claims as rumors and lies2.
Sources
- 1
The White House, 2021. FACT SHEET: New U.S. Government Actions on Forced Labor in Xinjiang .
US import ban on Hoshine products and Entity List additions of Xinjiang silicon companies, June 2021.
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CBP has issued a WRO on silica-based products made by Hoshine Silicon Industry Co., Ltd., a company located in Xinjiang
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Hoshine Silicon Industry (Shanshan); Xinjiang Daqo New Energy; Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals; Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology, and XPCC
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- 2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2021. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on June 22, 2021 .
China's reply to US measures on Xinjiang solar companies.
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Its real purpose is to restrict and contain the development of relevant sectors and enterprises in China
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nothing but rumors with ulterior motives and downright lies
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- 3
S. De La Feld, Eunews, 2025. EU tightens up on ferroalloy imports, including from Norway and Iceland .
EU safeguard on ferroalloys, November 2025, with the stated positions of the Commission and Norway.
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including close partners Norway and Iceland
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We cannot afford to let a strategic sector collapse under the weight of increasing import pressures
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We do not agree with the EU on this point and, for the companies concerned in Norway, this will have a negative impact
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the market share of EU producers has dropped from 38% to 24%
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- 4
L. Murphy and N. Elimä, Sheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, 2021. In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains , Key findings; Introduction.
Labor transfer programs in Xinjiang and the silicon and polysilicon companies linked to them.
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Polysilicon manufacturers in the Uyghur Region account for approximately 45% of the world’s solar-grade polysilicon supply
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documents the … placement … of 2.6 million minoritised citizens in jobs in farms and factories within the Uyghur Region
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Hoshine Silicon Industry, the metallurgical-grade silicon producer in the region with the highest production capacity, has participated in labour transfer programmes
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The government claims that these programmes are in accordance with PRC law and that workers are engaged voluntarily
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Daqo alone is a supplier to the four largest solar module manufacturers in the world
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- 5
M. Davidson and S. Qian, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026. China's Solar Industry Upheaval: The Effects Will Be Global .
China's share of polysilicon, the price fall of 2023 and 2024, job cuts and the plan to buy and close capacity.
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the industry’s top five … slashed their workforce by over 30 percent in 2024
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over a 70 percent decline … followed by another 40 percent drop in 2024
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- 6
U.S. Geological Survey, 2026. Sand and Gravel (Industrial), in Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 , pp. 1–2: World Production; World Resources.
World output of industrial silica sand in 2025.
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especially those concerning crystalline silica exposure
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- 7
EY Tax News, 2026. US Section 232 proclamation establishes minimum import prices and a 15 percent tariff on polysilicon and derivative products .
The US polysilicon tariff and minimum import price of August 2026, and the findings behind it.
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declined from 50% in 2005 to less than 2% in 2024
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The stated intent is to establish a commercially viable domestic market
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- 8
TaiyangNews, 2025. China Dominates 2024 Global Polysilicon Production .
Chinese polysilicon stocks in mid-2025 and the EU forced labor regulation.
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China’s domestic polysilicon inventory stood at 367,000 tons
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the European Union’s regulation on forced labor comes into effect in December 2027
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- 9
U.S. Congress, 2021. Public Law 117–78, Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act , Sections 2 and 3.
The presumption against goods from Xinjiang and polysilicon as a high-priority sector.
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apply a presumption that, with respect to any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
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clear and convincing evidence, that the good, ware, article, or merchandise was not mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by forced labor
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a list of high-priority sectors for enforcement, which shall include cotton, tomatoes, and polysilicon
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